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M
y assigned 
task is to 
talk about 
the importance of two 
communities working 
together. Some people 
may think the work of 
operations analysis 
and the development 
of models and simulations are indistin­
guishable. They are wrong, and I must take 
a few minutes to point out some severe dis­
tinctions between the communities. That 
will lead to the nature of the desirable col­
laboration, which is my subject. That in 
turn leads naturally to a central problem in 
academia, for which the solution is to 
"open doors and windows" - a term I 
borrow from one of NPS's four Distin­
guished Graduates, the estimable Lui Pao
Choen of Singapore. 
Operations Analysis 
Operations Analysis (OA) was borne in 
wartime with little more to work with than 
a sense of patriotism, slide rules, and an 
understanding of physics, human nature, 
and the scientific process. In the 1960s, a 
decade after the first masters degrees in 
OA had been awarded at the Naval Post­
graduate School, two things happened. The 
first was a shift of emphasis, stimulated by 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
and his Comptroller, Charles J. Hitch,
from operations analysis for the fleet, to 
systems analysis for procurement decisions 
in the Pentagon. Since then for 40 years the 
pendulum has swung back and forth 
between the goal of better operations and 
tactics and the goal of wiser decisions in 
Washington. The second thing was, of 
course, burgeoning computer power. In the 
use of computers there was no pendulum 
swing. The OA community never flagged 
in its zeal to apply computer power to 
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increasingly sophisticated simulations of 
phenomena. 
In my view, the use of computer simu­
lations is excessive and we analysts ought 
to apply the same standards of cost versus 
effectiveness that we demand of everybody 
else to determine whether the rewards war­
rant the risks and costs. There ha_ye been 
some atrocious examples of costly failures 
in simulations. I don't bring this up to flog 
simulations but to point out that because 
there are big bucks associated with simula­
tion building, we analysts slid down a slip­
pery slope and ever so subtly came to 
equate model building with analysis. We 
forgot that our purpose is to help make bet­
ter decisions. I realized what was going on 
when people came and asked me "what 
model should I use to investigate such-and­
such ?" The proper question is "do you 
know someone who can help me decide 
such-and-such?" An experienced analyst in 
the field of such-and-such problems will 
know how to approach the problem and 
what kind of model to use, which may be 
and often is some equations written on the 
back of an envelope. In any event, a vigor­
ous effort to do some hard thinking (in the 
full sense of the word hard), gather some 
relevant data, and write some equations 
that describe the essential properties of 
such-and-such, is almost always what you 
do first. You may or may not want to build 
or adapt a complicated simulation later. 
Just for starters, if you find out there is no 
data, you can't use a simulation that 
requires 5,000 inputs. Without data a com­
plicated simulation is rarely an improve­
ment on an artful mathematical model 
with, say, ten parameters. Of course, the 
artistry is everything. That explains why 
the proper question is "who do you know 
that can help me?" If decision making is 
involved then computers can be a trap. An 
analyst who tries to substitute computer 
power for hard thought is only half an ana-
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lyst. Computers can't substitute for artistic 
skill, at least not very often. Now, when you 
need a simulation it is because hard think­
ing can't substitute. I have in mind physical 
models like the dynamic representation of 
neutron flux in a reactor design. Or the con­
figuration of genomes and chromosomes. 
Or complex aspects of aerodynamics or 
warship hydrodynamics. Or the configura­
tion of the facilities in a bridge or combat 
center. Or the design of the first manned 
satellite. 
The point is that 95% of all decisions 
can be improved, and much fundamental 
knowledge can be extended, without resort 
to a simulation. 
Operations analysis is applied science. 
A lot of academic work is in basic research 
which tries to find general propositions, 
widely applicable. It took me about five 
years to work out the salvo equations and 
another five to write them up because 
nobody was paying me to develop this fun­
damental variation from Lanchester equa­
tions. I also spent a lot of time looking for a 
fatal flaw, because the message of the salvo 
equations is bad news for an all-big-ship 
fleet. 
I regard building complicated simula­
tions, ours, yours, the Applied Physics 
Lab's, Cal Tech's, 9r anyone else's as gen­
eral research. Why? Because they cost a lot 
of money and so if they aren't widely 
applicable they aren't worth it. Therefore 
when I make the point that the analysis 
community and the modeling and simula­
tion communities need to talk to each other 
I mean that we have a few, vital areas for 
intense collaboration. A Venn diagram 
would show a five or ten percent overlap. 
Modeling and Simulation 
So much for the point of view that analy­
sis and modeling are indistinguishable. 
The operations research community pop- . 
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ularized models as descriptors of phenome-
na, but modeling now extends far beyond 
the boundaries of operations research. 
Dynamic representations of phenomena 
are found throughout science, engineering, 
finance, transportation, and medicine - it 
is hard to find a community that does not 
apply them, and it is a bold analyst who 
would still claim proprietorship over them. 
A measure of OR's success is the extent to 
which models and simulations have infil-
trated the world. 
Modeling ( creating representations of) 
intricate scientific phenomena has expand-
ed far beyond both the military and com-
mercial operations restarch communities. 
Our child has grown up. He has his own 
skills and culture and purposes. We must 
let him find his own way to develop 
sophisticated simulations of, say, virtual 
environments, genetic algorithms, and rep-
resentations that illuminate the theories of 
complexity and chaos. 
Taxonomies differ, but my own, adopt-
ed by the Military Operations Research 
Society (MORS), uses "model" as the 
umbrella term, under which are mathemati-
cal representations (analytical models), 
computer simulations with no man in the 
loop, war games with human participants, 
and field exercises in which humans use 
actual equipment extensively. There are 
also hybrids in which a few real pieces of 
equipment are combined with simulated 
representations all netted together. Other 
lists can be found in the three editions of 
Military Modeling for Decision Making 
published by MORS. These help a compre-
hensive understanding of the modeling 
community, but here I simply want it 
understood that even for military purposes 
models and simulations are like the ele-
phant and the blind men who describe a 
different beast depending on which limb 
they touch. 
Then there are simulators used for train-
ing or testing or entertainment. Simulators 
must involve a human participant and so 
are neither a military simulation operated 
without human involvement or a "war 
game" except in a bastardized sense. With 
simulators we are getting very close to the 
domain of Naval Postgraduate School's 
popular MOVES Center for the develop-
ment and construction of artificial environ-
men ts into which human subjects are 
placed for any of the above purposes. 
Next we have come to the most impor-
tant connection between analysis and mod-
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eling. I use a simple illustration from per-
sonal experience. By the mid-1970s I had 
about ten years of practical experience in 
military OR. I knew a lot about modeling 
and experimentation for investigative pur-
poses-for improving tactics and developing 
better fighting machines. Then I became 
the Chief of Naval Education and Training 
Support (CNET SUPPORT). I learned my 
ignorance of the vast use of models for 
training. I had seen a big F1eet ASW (Anti 
Submarine Warfare) trainer used to teach 
hunter-killer tactics and tried war gaming 
on the huge Naval Electronic Warfare Sim-
ulator at the Naval War College. But as 
CNET SUPPORT, I became responsible 
for the development and operation of the 
Navy's family of aircraft simulators that 
taught pilots how to fly. Aircraft simulators 
were everywhere, they were expensive, 
they did miraculous things, and their appli-
cation was very controversial! Incidentally, 
they still are all of those things. I just 
signed forward a research proposal by one 
of our operations analysts in human fac-
tors, Mike McCauley, to do experimenta-
tion with Army helicopters at Fort Rucker. 
In the 1970s it was dawning on folks 
that the objective of simulator fidelity-of 
motion and visual cues-had been taken to 
ridiculous extremes. There was a TA-4 
simulator which the developer claimed did 
not just emulate the handling and aerody-
namics of TA-4 aircraft in general. He said 
it duplicated the performance of one partic-
ular, actual TA-4, and he could tell you its 
side number! When operations analysts-
whom we called education specialists-
tested learning effectiveness they found 
that motion had little or no value, yet some 
traiJ1ers had been built at great expense 
with six degrees of motion. They also 
found out how much visual detail with 
computer graphics was enough to teach 
landings and nap-of-the-earth flying. For 
night carrier landing practice nothing but 
the carrier deck lights-little pinpoints on a 
black background-are needed to give a 
fighter pilot sweaty palms in the simula-
tor's cockpit. All of us here know that 
graphical representation can be pretty 
sketchy when the aircraft is traveling at 
several hundred knots, but in the 1970s that 
truth was just trickling over from the oper-
ations analysts to officer aviators in the 
Naval Air Systems Command, which 
wrote the specs and paid the bills. 
These are the things that the computer 
software designer does not know how to 
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test and why operations analysis are indis-
pensable. They were true then, and they are 
still true today. 
Opening the Doors 
Now we come to my deeper message 
and the notion of "opening doors." P. C. 
Lui, the Chief Defence Scientist in his 
Ministry of Defence and adjunct professor 
at the University of Singapore, coined the 
phrase to explain that collaboration is more 
like creating doors in a house than the 
hackneyed analogy of "eliminating 
stovepipes." To eliminate stovepipes is to 
create a one-room house. It is an invitation 
to chaos. Cutting doors in walls allows 
communication to take place without the 
loss of privacy and quiet for contempla-
tion. Let me stretch the analogy a bit fur-
ther. Consider education in a one-room 
schoolhouse. To teach eight grades in one 
room you had to be organized, you had to 
maintain discipline, and you had to have 
the knowledge of a Renaissance Man. One 
such renaissance man, by the way, was my 
mother, who drove her own horse and 
buggy from home to teach in her one-room 
school. 
A university is not very good at opening 
doors. Traditional disciplines organized in 
departments are the rooms in a university, 
and few departments know how to open 
communications to pursue cross-discipline 
studies. Professors teach their disciplines 
and explore their well-defined domains in 
depth. They feel they must be soloists in 
order to stay current with the advances in 
their disciplines. To an extent they are 
right. Even in a department as well-defined 
as computer science, a university faculty 
does not know how a graduate will apply 
the education. He may work many places 
and do many quite different things. One, 
but only one, of those applications is a 
career in building computer models and 
simulations. 
But the Navy is interested in military 
domains like undersea, surface, and air 
warfare, or like operational logistics and 
information operations. At NPS we deal 
with this problem in part by creating 
departments that encompass military 
domains. For instance they teach opera-
tional logistics in the Operations Research 
Department and their models apply to 
logistics problems. Information warfare is 
taught in the Information Sciences Depart-
(See WORKING TOGETHER, p. 33) 
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foundly capitalizes on distributed, net-
worked effects. Advantage can emerge 
from a broad pool of inputs and manifest 
itself in a multitude of ways, each of 
which will likely not be evident to an 
opponent until advantage is ready to be 
applied. A primary source of advantage 
in distributed, networked coalition 
forces, arises from networked effects dis-
tributed in many dimensions throughout 
a force that can be summoned for use in 
the manner dictated by evolving condi-
tions. 
There are many impediments to the 
vision of NCO, including economic, cul-
tural, doctrinal, anq technical factors, 
along with the risk of introducing new 
vulnerabilities. These factors act as both 
constraints and challenges, limiting and 
shaping the networked force configura-
tions and concepts of operation that can 
practically be realized. In a coalition 
force, the same constraints apply, often 
for intractable reasons rooted in sover-
eignty issues. It is generally recognized 
that the complexity of the netted force 
will demand a co-evolution of systems, 
technology and doctrine. Force experi-
mentation has been adopted as the co-
evolution mechanism. However, it is 
not feasible to explore the requisite paths 
by experimentation alone; attempts to do 
so yield heuristics that create a risk of 
misunderstanding the gap between 
experiment-observed and battlespace-
realized capability. Appropriate analyti-
cal methods need to be applied to 
explore adequately the problem space in 
a timely, tractable and affordable man-
ner. 
• WG 6: Applying NCO to an Actual 
Event. This working group will examine 
the application of Network Centric Oper-
ations in support of recent operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Some potential 
topics include collaborative targets, what 
length of time is "critical," how quick-
turnaround analyses support the event, 
what type(s) of analysis(es) is(are) rec-
ommended, and the different ways that 
operations analysis and lessons learned 
were used to reduce time for time critical 
strikes. Additionally, if possible, the 
working group plans to look at the data 
for Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi 
Freedom, such as the percentage of air-
craft that took off without defined targets 
and how many of these actually hit 
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"good" targets. The participants will 
look for the limiting factors, the tools 
and techniques, and the different ways 
that operations analysis can help take 
information and enable events. 
Attendance 
Attendance is limited to 200 people -
or about thirty participants per working 
group. If you are interested in attending 
the mini-symposium to ascertain the state 
Workshop Co-Chair Dennis Baer 
Workshop Co-Chair Kirk Michealson 
Technical Co-Chair Dr Richard Hayes 
Technical Co-Chair Dr David Alberts 
Synthesis Chair Dr Jerry Kotchka, FS 
WG 1 Chair Jim Jacobs 
WG2Chair Dr Dan Maxwell 
WG3Chair Dr Mark Youngren 
WG4Chair Bob Gregg 
WG5Chair COL PatVye 
WG6Chair Maj Sean Deller 
MORSEVP Brian Engler 
MORSVPA Natalie Kelly 
WORKING TOGETHER 
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ment, sometimes with models that repre-
sent networks. A harder problem is to 
move from mathematical knowledge to 
physics to mechanical and civil engineer-
ing,' or in the Navy's case to marine and 
space engineering, using models for ship 
design and satellite deployment. 
NPS research also serves the Navy and 
DoD. Key components are three research 
institutes. They open doors across campus 
to foster interdisciplinary studies. The 
Wayne Meyer Institute of Engineering and 
Analysis is in its fourth year-long project. 
It incorporates the work of as many as 15 
faculty and 80 students and several depart-
ments. A typical project involves space 
engineering, operational logistics, warship 
design, information operations, mission 
analysis, and future tactics. This takes 
more than systems engineering. This is the 
design of a system of systems. Models and 
simulations are vital contributors to the 
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of the practice, and/or participating in the 
workshop by "rolling up your sleeves" and 
making a contribution, please go to the 
MORS web-site at http://www. mors.org 
and click on the "Operations Analysis Sup-
port for Network Centric Operations" link 
or call the MORS Office (703-933-9070) 
to request an application. 
If you have any questions, please feel 















projects but they are many and varied. The 
project is as close to working in one 
room-having no stovepipes-as one is 
likely to get. Do I need to tell you this 
highly integrative thinking is hard to do? 
But it is ideal education for officers who 
will do the same kind of systems thinking 
for the rest of their military lives. 
I have indicated very briefly the domain 
of 21st Century military operations analy-
sis. Almost from the beginning OA has 
modeled and simulated the dynamics of 
warfare, but its models must be subordi-
nate to the purpose of operations analysis, 
which is to help make better operational 
and programmatic decisions. Second, I 
have indicated the expanded breadth of the 
modeling and simulation community. It is 
our child but its applications are now ubiq-
uitous and extend far beyond our domain. 
Finally, I have offered that both communi-
ties must be allowed to work in their own 
rooms but they must keep the door open 
between them and stay connected. 0 
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